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We set up an open-economy, three-country version of the endogenous-mortality
model of Lagerl¤ of (forthcoming in the International Economic Review). The
model is calibrated to pre-industrial mortality data from England, France and
Sweden. Fitting parameters to match observed rates of correlation in mortal-
ity rates, the model can also account for: (1) diﬀerences in the volatility of
mortality rates; and (2) diﬀerences in the timing of the industrial revolution.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper explains patterns of volatility and correlation in pre-industrial mor-
tality rates in England, Sweden and France, as well as the timing of the in-
dustrial revolution across these countries. We use a growth model where the
mortality rate is endogenous, but also subject to exogenous shocks. Whereas
the distribution of these shocks does not change over time, the way an economy
reacts to them does. The central assumptions are the following: The eﬀects of a
shock are (1) more severe if population density is high (capturing e.g. that dis-
eases then spread more easily)1; and (2) less severe if the human capital stock
is large (capturing the mortality reducing eﬀects of e.g. medical knowledge).
We also allow population and human capital to be connected via a scale eﬀect:
productivity in human capital production is higher in more densely populated
economies, where ideas spread more easily.2
This theory builds on recent work by Lagerl¤ of (2003). The basic idea is that
an industrial revolution is the outcome of a set of favorable mortality shocks
which allow population to expand. This raises human capital productivity and
generates a quantity-quality shift in children, which lowers birth rates and spurs
faster growth in human capital: an industrial revolution and a demographic
transition.
Whereas Lagerl¤ of (2003) considers only one economy (or, equivalently, sev-
eral isolated economies), here we allow for several economies which are partly
integrated. Thus mortality depends not only on domestic shocks, human cap-
ital, and population, but also on that of other countries.3 For each country
pair there is a parameter capturing their degree of integration. If this param-
1This is consistent with the fact that pre-industrial death rates were higher in cities than
rural areas (Kunitz 1983). See also Diamond (1999, Ch. 11).
2This is consistent with the results from Glaeser and Mar· e (2001), who ￿nd that densely
populated areas (cities) have an advantage in human capital accumulation.
3The idea that diseases and other mortality shocks can spread between countries is very
plausible. The Black Death spread from Caﬀa in the Crimea in 1346 to Scandinavia in 1350
(McNeill 1998, pp. 177-178). It is also likely that England had low transportation costs to
France and the Netherlands already in the middle ages (see Clarke 2001, p. 65).
2eter is zero for all country pairs, each country is autonomous; if the parameter
equals one for all country pairs, they behave as if they were one and the same
economy.4
We calibrate a three-country version of this model by setting the interaction
parameters to roughly ￿t the simulated correlation in mortality rates to that
in data from pre-industrial England, France, and Sweden. In the data, English
and French mortality is most closely correlated; Sweden is less correlated with
both of them, but slightly more correlated with England than with France. This
is not too surprising, considering Sweden￿s geographical periphery.
After calibrating the model to ￿td i ﬀerences in correlation across countries,
we ￿nd that the model also generates a pattern of volatility in death rates which
￿ts well with data: England￿s simulated death rate is more stable than that of
France, which in turn is more stable than that of Sweden. What drives this result
is the shock-spreading eﬀect of integration. If two countries are fully integrated,
they function as one economy receiving the average of the two countries￿ shocks.
However, the most simple version of the model cannot account for observed
diﬀerences in the timing of the industrial revolution. The reason is that, if all
countries are otherwise identical, the country with more volatile death rates
should industrialize ￿rst, since it faces a higher probability of receiving a set
of favorable shocks. Thus, the model seems to suggest that Sweden should
industrialize ￿rst, and England last. However, we can account for what we see
in data by letting England have an exogenous advantage in the production of
human capital. This could constitute a feature of English society which is not
captured by the model.5
Not too surprisingly, this modi￿ed setting can replicate England￿s lead in
industrialization. What is less obvious, however, is that the model can now
4A more semantic diﬀerence compared to Lagerl¤ of (2003) is that we talk also about other
shocks than epidemics, such as wars, revolutions, and bad harvests. In the data, mortality
rose e.g. in the turmoil following the French Revolution.
5For instance, von Hayek (1960) argues that English common law was superior to French
civil law. Also, being geographically close to the Atlantic may have helped Britain by inducing
trade and thus the development of growth-enhancing institutions (cf. Acemoglu et al. 2003).
3also account for the fact that France imported the industrial revolution earlier
than Sweden. Once again, the integration parameter is crucial: France is more
closely integrated with England (since we calibrated the model to ￿t the corre-
lation in mortality), so the take-oﬀ in English human capital growth will reduce
French mortality rates, thus generating a population expansion, which drives an
increase in human-capital productivity, and pushes France onto the sustained
growth path. Sweden, being more isolated, cannot import England￿s low death
rate as eﬀectively.
We contribute to an expanding literature on the escape from Malthusian
stagnation to modern growth. Our ambition is to use one uni￿ed framework to
explain many facts. This approach follows e.g. Galor and Weil (1999, 2000), Ga-
lor and Moav (2002), and Galor and Mountford (2003).6 As in Lagerl¤ of (2003),
our paper diﬀers from these in the stochastic timing of the industrial revolution,
the endogeneity of mortality, and the role played by mortality shocks.7 The ma-
jor contribution here, compared to Lagerl¤ of (2003), lies in the combination of
an open-economy setting and a uni￿ed framework. This enables us to analyze a
potential mechanism through which industrialization diﬀuses from one economy
to others.8
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
data. The model is introduced in Section 3, ￿rst in the single-economy setting,
and then when there are many economies. Section 4 derives the quantitative
results, and Section 5 ends with a concluding discussion.
6Other contributors to this literature include Jones (2001), K¤ ogel and Prskawetz (2001),
Tamura (2002a,b), Hansen and Prescott (2002), and Lucas (2002, Ch. 5) .
7Related growth models with endogenous mortality include Jones (2001), Kalemli-Ozcan
(2003a,b), Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2002), and Tamura (2002b). Diﬀerent from our setting,
Kalemli-Ozcan and Tamura analyze how falling mortality reduces the precautionary demand
for children.
8There is a large literature on why some countries industrialize later than others. In our
model the diﬀusion works via the mortality rate, but we could think of diﬀerent mechanisms;
see e.g. Tamura (1996) and Lucas (2002, Ch. 4). Empirical work by Acemoglu et al. (2001)
study the importance of mortality among European settlers for migration and the diﬀusion
of European institutions.
4Figure 1: Mortality rates 1749-1839.
2T h e F a c t s
2.1 Mortality rates
Figure 1 shows the mortality rates for England, France, and Sweden in 1749-
1839, measured by the Crude Death Rate (CDR), i.e., the total number of
deaths per 1000 people.9 1749 is the earliest year for which we have comparable
data from all countries. The period after 1839 is not reported in the sources
we have available, but is not too interesting here, since we want to look at the
Malthusian phase of development which preceded the period in which mortality
started to fall. A reasonable de￿nition of the Malthusian phase could be the
period up to about 1800; after that both levels and volatility in mortality rates
started to decline.
Figure 2 shows the variance in mortality rates over diﬀerent 25-year periods
9The sources are: for England, Wrigley and Sho￿eld (1981, Table A3.3); for France, INED
(1977, Tableau Annexe I); for Sweden, Statistics Sweden (1999). Fogel (1997) provides an
overview of several other studies using this data.
5Figure 2: Variance in mortality rates over 25-year periods (without de-trending).
The start year refers to the ￿rst year of each 25-year period.
1749-1814 (i.e., the value for 1749 refers to the variance over the period 1749
to 1773). Throughout, England had a much lower variance than both France
and Sweden. We also note that the variance in Swedish and French mortality
rates ￿uctuate a lot over time. This is driven by a couple of very large mortality
peaks. For example, the big drop in Sweden￿s variance for periods starting after
1773 was due to the spike in Swedish mortality rates that year (see Figure 1).
Put another way: periods starting post 1773 do not include this spike and thus
have much lower variance than earlier periods. Similarly, the temporary increase
in the variance in French mortality rates in periods starting after 1770 is due
to the French Revolution in 1789 and ￿The Great Terror￿ under Robespierre,
with mortality peaking in 1794.
From Figure 2 is seems that Sweden mostly had more volatile death rates
than France. This in particular holds for the Malthusian phase, say before 1800
(i.e., 25-year periods starting before 1776). The same picture emerges if we
6Correlation coeﬃcients
England France Sweden Variance
England 1 - - 2.9
France 0.34 1 - 10.4
Sweden 0.18 0.08 1 19.1
Table 1: Correlation and variance in mortality after linear de-trending.
de-trend the series and look at the variance for the whole period. As shown in
Table 1, Sweden has the highest variance and England the lowest; France lies
in between.
Finally, the correlation between the mortality rates across the three countries
is shown in Figure 3. The correlation coeﬃcient is calculated for 25-year periods
starting with the year indicated. As seen, the correlation between each pair of
the three countries ￿uctuates a lot over time, and all countries seem to be less
correlated with eachother around the time of the French Revolution.10
Again, if we focus on the era up to 1775 the correlation between England and
France was clearly the highest, at about 0.5. Sweden was much less correlated
with both France and England, which is not surprising considering Sweden￿s
geographical periphery. For most periods, it seems that Sweden was slightly
more correlated with England than with France. This also holds if we look at
the correlation matrix in Table 1, where the correlation coeﬃcients refer to the
whole period, after linear de-trending.
2.2 The timing of the industrial revolution
Figure 4 shows the levels of GDP per capita in England (actually the United
Kingdom), France, and Sweden, for about 4 centuries starting 1500. (The 20th
century had some unique shocks to GDP growth associated with the wars; here
we are focusing on earlier periods.) Incomes per capita started to grow ￿rst
10Curiously, the very correletion coeﬃcients seem to move in tandem, so that the degree of
correlation across one pair of countries seems highly correlated with the other pairs.
7Figure 3: The correlation between mortality rates over 25-year periods. The
start year refers to the ￿r s ty e a ro fe a c h2 5 - y e a rp e r i o d .
in England. France followed with a slightly shorter lag than Sweden. The
timing diﬀerence could be about a century, in the sense that it took until 1820
for France and Sweden to reach about the same level of GDP per capita as
England had reached by 1700. This amounts to about 4 generations in terms of
an overlapping-generations model.
3 The model
3.1 A single economy
Consider ￿rst the model set up by Lagerl¤ of (2003), where there is only one
economy (or many isolated economies). Agents live in childhood and as adults.
Children consume nothing, so period-t output (Yt) equals adult consumption
(Ct), as given by
8Figure 4: Levels of income per capita. Source: Maddison (2001, Table B-21).
Yt =[ 1− (v + ht)Bt](L + Ht)=Ct,( 1 )
where L+Ht denotes productivity of a unit of time. Nature equips every agent
with L units of skills, whereas Ht measures a component resulting from parental
investment, referred to as human capital.
Bt denotes the number of children, and v +ht the time spent on each child,
where v is a ￿xed time cost and ht denotes education time (which is a control
variable to the parent). Each parent has a unit time endowment, so time input
in the consumption goods sector is 1 − (v + ht)Bt.
Out of the Bt born children, a fraction Tt survive to adult age. Let Pt denote
the (adult) population size in period t, which also measures population density
since land size is ￿xed. The survival rate is an increasing function of the ratio of
human capital over population (Ht/Pt) and take this simple parametric form:




where ωt denotes the period-t mortality shock, which is log-normally distributed,
and thus always positive, implying that the survival rate lies between 0 and 1:
ln(ωt) ∼ N(￿,σ2). (3)
Human capital is produced using
Ht+1 = A(Pt)[L + Ht](ρv + ht), (4)
where ρ < 1 (capturing that education time is more productive than ￿nursing￿
time in building human capital). The scale eﬀect in human capital production
is captured by A0(Pt) > 0. We specify A(Pt)a s :











where A∗ > e A,a n dη > 0. This functional form ensures that increasing popu-
lation density does not raise human-capital productivity inde￿nitely, but only
up to the level A∗, and that zero population implies positive human-capital
productivity (since A∗ − e A>0).
3.1.1 Preferences
An adult agent active in period t (referred to as agent t) maximizes a utility
function given by
Ut =l n ( Ct)+αln(BtTt)+αδ ln(L + Ht+1)( 6 )
subject to (1) and (4). We assume that δ ∈ (ρ,1) (see below), and that α > 0.
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if Pt > Γ(Ht)
0i f Pt ≤ Γ(Ht)
,( 8 )







.T h e t w o
cases in (8) follow from the non-negativity constraint on ht. Notably, whether
ht is operative (not constrained to zero), or not, depends on the levels of Ht
and Pt.
The important feature of the model is the co-existence of two types of equi-
libria. First of all, there is a Malthusian steady state, where ht is constrained
to zero and birth rates thus high. Since parents invest little in their children,
human capital is low and mortality high. This keeps population stationary in
levels, but at the same time highly volatile, since a low human capital stock
makes the economy vulnerable to mortality shocks.
There also exists a sustained growth path, where ht is operative, and human
capital and population both exhibit sustained growth, but human capital grows
faster. Thus, Ht/Pt approaches in￿nity, implying that the eﬀect of the mortality
shocks becomes negligible, and the survival rate goes to 100%.
An economy can transit from a Malthusian steady state to sustained growth
by experiencing a series of suﬃciently mild shocks. This leads to lower mortality
and rising population growth. Via the scale eﬀect on human capital production
this raises human capital productivity and induces a quality-quantity shift at
the point in time when the (ht ≥ 0)-constraint stops to be binding.
3.2 Many economies
Next we consider several economies, or countries, interacting with each other.
The only diﬀerence is that the death rate in each country now depends not only
11on domestic ￿ but also foreign ￿ shocks and state variables. Let kij ∈ [0,1]
measure the degree of ￿integration￿ between countries i and j, and let there be
N countries, indexed by the set {1,2,...N}. Analogous to (2) we now let the













where ωj,t is the mortality shock to country j,a n dHj,t and Pj,t now denote
h u m a nc a p i t a la n dp o p u l a t i o ni nc o u n t r yj. These shocks are independent
across countries and over time.
Diﬀerent from the case in (2) mortality now depends on non-domestic vari-
ables. First of all, through the interaction parameter kij, the human capital
stock in country j tends to mitigate the eﬀect of a mortality shock in coun-
try i. This could capture medical knowledge, plants, or food imported from
neighboring countries, or more direct medical assistance.
The interaction eﬀect also implies that mortality shocks in country j raise
mortality in country i, and more so if country j has a large population. This
could capture the facilitated spread of diseases between regions which are more
densely populated. The Black Death resulted from increased interaction across
diﬀerent Eurasian regions, when larger densities of human (and rat) populations
facilitated the spread of plague germs. Also, those regions in Europe which were
spared from the Black Death were often geographically, or otherwise, isolated.
(See McNeill 1998, Ch. 4.)
3.2.1 Implications
Just as in the one-country case, given identical parameters across countries, we
have both a growth path on which human capital in all countries grow at an
identical sustained rate, and a non-growing stationary state with volatile death
rates. When one country￿s human capital starts growing it will pull down the
death rates of other countries, and thus ￿export￿ its population expansion and
12industrial revolution.
Integration here amounts to spreading mortality shocks across countries. In
the extreme case when all countries are fully integrated the model boils down the
one-country setting, but with each country receiving the average of all countries￿
shocks.11 Integration thus amounts to the opposite of a mean-preserving spread.
This is consistent with the data discussed earlier: More isolated countries, like
Sweden, had more volatile death rates.
Moreover, since the industrial revolution in this model is driven by a series of
mild shocks (which expand population and thus raise human capital productiv-
ity) a small variance in death rates tends to generate late industrialization. This
may seem counter-intuitive, but recall that shocks here can be both positive and
negative, i.e., both reduce and raise mortality. A rise in mortality can reduce
population, but population eventually adjusts back to its stationary Malthu-
sian level. A fall in mortality, by contrast, can lead to a population expansion
which ￿ through the scale eﬀect in human capital production ￿ may push the
economy onto sustained growth for ever. In short, 10 bad shocks followed by
10 good may bring an industrial revolution, whereas 20 average shocks may
not. Therefore ￿ ceteris paribus ￿ a more isolated country, with more volatile
death rates, would tend to industrialize sooner, since a sequence of suﬃciently
favorable shocks would arrive sooner. In that sense, our model would predict
that Sweden should industrialize ￿rst, which is clearly not the case.
On the other hand, given that one ￿leading￿ country, like England, starts to
11To see this, set all kij = 1, and let initial human capital and population, H0 and P0,b e
identical across countries. That is, Hi,t +
PN−1
j6=i kijHj,t = NH0 and similarly for population.
















Thus, each intergrated economy behaves like an isolated economy receiving the average shock.
Note also that since death rates are the same in period 0, so is next period￿s population and
human capital stocks, so that all countries stay identical over time.
13industrialize ￿ e.g. due to exogenously given favorable institutions ￿ a country
which is more integrated with England will ￿import￿ lower death rates, thus
generating its own population expansion and industrial revolution. More pre-
cisely, if we stack the cards so that England is more likely to industrialize ￿rst,
we should see France follow with a slightly shorter lag than Sweden. This is
consistent with data. In the calibration below we are capturing this by let-
ting England￿s productivity in human capital production be higher than that of
France and Sweden.
4 Quantitative analysis
The next step is to calibrate and simulate the model. Since every run of the
economy has a stochastic outcome, we do a Monte Carlo simulation, i.e., we run
the model until the industrial revolution arrives in all countries, and repeat the
exercise 10,000 times.
One challenge is to ￿nd parameter values which can both ensure the type
of multiplicity of growth paths the model serves to generate, and give plausible
values for the endogenous growth rates. Most parameter values are chosen as
in Lagerl¤ of (2003) where the growth rate of per-capita income on the balanced
growth path is calibrated to 2.6% annually, the population growth rate to 0.5%
annually, and the birth rate in the Malthusian Regime (i.e., where ht =0 )t o
3% annually. Each period corresponds to 25 years.12
We also have some new parameters compared to Lagerl¤ of (2003), namely
the interaction parameters across the three countries ￿ England, France, and
Sweden ￿ which we denote kEF, kES,a n dkFS (with obvious notation). Then
we need to set a lower level of e A for England; we choose to set it 5% lower than
France and Sweden (i.e., e AEng =0 .95 ￿ e AFra/Swe). This means that England
has a higher level of human capital productivity, A(Pt), at any (￿nite) level of
12To make the model￿s death rate ￿t with the Crude Death Rate in the data we ￿rst calculate
the annual mortality rate as 1−T
1/25
i,t , and then multiply by 1000. Similarly, we compute the







14Parameter ρδ α vL A ∗ η
Value 0.0046 0.4615 0.067 0.03 500 74.21 2
Parameter e AFra/Swe e AEng kEF kES kFS ￿ σ2
Value 55.75 2 .90 .23 0.04 0.01 −3.90 .15
Table 2: Parameter values.
population, Pt [see (5)].13
Table 2 shows the full list of parameter values.
We have choosen the integration parameters (the k￿ s )s ot h a tt h es i m u l a t e d
correlation coeﬃcients across country pairs are roughly in line with those in
the data for the Malthusian phase, say up to 1775 (see Figure 3 again). The
simulated correlation coeﬃcients are shown in Table 3.
It is harder to ￿t the rates of variance in the model￿s mortality rate to data,
but there are several reasons why this should not be a concern. Firstly, for
France and Sweden the variance ￿uctuates a lot depending on what time period
we look at (see Figure 2). Secondly, it is not obvious how one should interpret
the annual mortality rate in the data, in terms of the mortality rate in the
model, where each period corresponds to 25 years.14 Thirdly, the variance in
English mortality had already started to decline by 1749 and the period shown
in Figure 3 need not be representative of England￿s Malthusian phase.
The simulated rates of variance for France and Sweden are shown Table 3.
The success here is in the ranking: Sweden￿s variance is higher than that of
France, which is higher than that of England. This is clearly consistent with
data.
Note also that the numbers shown in Table 3 represent the average over
13Note that we here let human capital productivity in each country depend only on domestic
population, i.e., the scale eﬀect is local.
14We set σ2 ab i tl o w e rc o m p a r e dt oL a g e r l ¤ of (2003), with the ambition to ￿t England￿s
simulated variance closer to that in the data. We could get a better ￿tb ys e t t i n gσ2 even
lower, at the cost of delaying industrialization and extending the needed computation time.
15Correlation coeﬃcients
England France Sweden Variance
England 1 - - 7.93
France 0.48 1 - 8.33
Sweden 0.10 0.04 1 12.28
Table 3: Variance and correlation in mortality rates in the Monte Carlo simu-
lation.
6000 runs, and hide a great deal over variation across runs. Figure 5 shows the
histograms over simulated rates variance for the three countries, and Figure 6
shows a similar histogram for the correlation coeﬃcients. As seen they vary a
great deal across runs.
One test of the model then comes in terms of diﬀerences in timing of the
industrial revolution. (We de￿ne the date for the industrial revolution as the
last period in which ht = 0.) This timing is stochastic. If all countries had
the same exogenous parameters (except for kEF, kES,a n dkFS), Sweden would
industrialize ￿rst on average, since its death rate is more volatile, due to its
relative isolation (kES and kFS are low). For the same reason, however, if luck
brings the industrial revolution ￿rst to e.g. England, Sweden would be less
able to import it than would France. Here we stack the cards so that England
industrializes more often, by lowering its parameter e A.
Trivially, this tends to make England industrialize earlier. The test, however,
comes from comparing Sweden and France. In our simulations, the industrial
revolution on average spreads to France sooner than to Sweden, since France
is more closely integrated with England. This in turn re￿ects that we have
calibrated the interaction parameter to ￿t the higher correlation in mortality
rates between England and France.
On average, England￿s lead over Sweden is a little more than a century (4.3
generations), and slightly less for France (4.0 generations). Again, these aver-
ages hide a great deal of variability across runs. Figure 7 shows the distribution
16Figure 5: Histogram over rates of variance in the Monte Carlo simulation.
17Figure 6: Histogram over rates of correlation in the Monte Carlo simulation.
18of the number of generations by which England precedes Sweden and France in
its industrialization. As seen, the distributions are twin-peaked. Negative num-
bers represent runs where Sweden or France, respectively, industrialize before
England, and the peak in the negative region stems from the fact that less inte-
grated regions have an inherit advantage in generating an industrial revolution,
since they receive more extreme shocks. The larger peak, in the positive region,
stems from England￿s higher human capital productivity.
4.1 One particular path
Figure 8 shows the paths of mortality, fertility, and population growth in the
three countries for one particular run. We transform generations into years by
letting each period correspond to 25 years and letting the industrial revolution
arrive in 1750. The population growth rate rises as mortality declines. As long
as education time is constrained to zero the fertility rate (here measured as the
Crude Fertility Rate, i.e., the number of births per 1000 people) is unchanged
[see (7)]. As population expands, and raises human-capital productivity, edu-
cation time becomes operative, and births rates start to fall pulling population
growth down.
The paths of per-capita income levels [as given by Yt in (1)] for each country,
are shown in Figure 9. In this run (but not all) per-capita income starts growing
￿rst in England, and then spreads ￿rst to France and later Sweden. This is
consistent with the pattern in Figure 4.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
Throughout human history epidemics, wars, and famines have shaped the growth
path of population. Such shocks to mortality are the central theme in the model
set up by Lagerl¤ of (2003), which can endogenously generate a long phase of stag-
nant population and living standards, followed by an industrial revolution and
a demographic transition (the so-called Three Regimes).
19Figure 7: Histogram over gaps in the timing of the industrial revolution in the
Monte Carlo simulation. (Negative numbers imply that England industrializes
later.)
20Figure 8: Population growth, birth, and death rates in one run.
21Figure 9: Income per capita, Yt, in one run.
22Here we extend that model to allow for several economies which are partially
integrated. A shock to mortality in one economy aﬀects mortality in all others.
We calibrate a three-country version of the model to data from pre-industrial
England, France, and Sweden, choosing parameter values to make the correla-
tion across countries￿ mortality rates ￿t the correlation in annual death rates in
the data. We then set exogenous parameters so that England is more likely to
industrialize ￿rst, capturing some exogenous institutional advantage.
The model is able to replicate the following empirical observations:
(1) England had the least volatile death rate and Sweden the most volatile;
France had something in between.
(2) The industrial revolution came to England ￿rst and spread to France
before it came to Sweden.
The second result is less obvious then it may seem. Of course, England
tends to industrialize ￿rst since we assume higher human-capital productivity
there. The interesting result is that, consistent with data (see Figure 4), the
industrial revolution diﬀuses to France sooner than to Sweden, since France
is more closely integrated with England. This in turn re￿ects that we have
calibrated the interaction parameter to ￿t the correlation in mortality rates
between England and France.
Our results also give some insights about per-capita income gaps observed
across countries today, and how and why the industrial revolution has diﬀused
from one part of the world to another. In our model, human capital accumu-
lation in the rich part of the world reduces death rates elsewhere. With lower
mortality rates and expanding population, poor countries￿ human capital pro-
ductivity increases, pushing them onto sustained growth. In recent history, this
could capture things like inoculation campaigns in poor countries.
Moreover, in our model mortality shocks which hit when a country is just
starting to industrialize can delay the take-oﬀ. The AIDS epidemic in many
poor countries today could constitute such a shock, potentially delaying their
industrialization by a number of generations, i.e., several centuries. Findings by
Kalemli-Ozcan (2001) suggest that something akin to this may be happening
23right now in Sub-Saharan Africa. She ￿nds that countries which are aﬀected
worst by the AIDS epidemic have seen abruptiones to their previous falls in
fertility and their rising levels of schooling, and more so than countries which
are less aﬀected by the AIDS epidemic.
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